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Echo Chambers in Parliamentary Twitter Networks:  
The Catalan Case 
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Social media is transforming relations among members of parliaments, but are members 
taking advantage of these new media to broaden their party and ideological 
communication environment, or they are mainly communicating with other party 
members and ideologically aligned peers? This article tests whether parliamentarians’ 
use of Twitter is opening communication flows or confining them to representatives of 
the same party or ideology. The study is based on a data set spanning the period 
January 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, which covers all relations (4,516), retweets 
(6,045), and mentions (19,507) among Catalan parliamentarians. Our results indicate 
that communication flows are polarized along party and ideological lines. The degree of 
polarization of this network depends, however, on where the interactions occur: The 
relations network is the most polarized; cross-party and cross-ideological interactions 
are greater in the retweet network and most present in the mention network. 
 
Keywords: polarization, Twitter, parliamentarians, social networks, Catalonia 
 
 
Democracy is based on the capacity of individuals to freely generate their opinions. To do so, 
they need to have access to a plurality of information sources (Dahl, 1998), and this access depends very 
much on the characteristics of their media environments. The increasing popularity and use of social 
media by parties, politicians, and the public in general has triggered a debate concerning the possibilities 
of these media to widen the public sphere (Habermas, 1989). Social media might facilitate the flow of 
ideas, information, attitudes, and opinions—for instance, by enabling direct contact between the public 
and party representatives (Golbeck, Grimes, & Rogers, 2010; Mackay, 2010; Missingham, 2010)—but 
they might also polarize politics (Colleoni, Rozza, & Arvidsson, 2014; Esteve Del Valle & Borge, 2017; 
Garcia, Abisheva, Schweighofer, Serdu, & Schweitzer, 2015; Gruzd & Roy, 2014; Roy, 2012). 
 
The controversy involving political polarization on social media touches a pillar of modern 
democracy: the necessity of a common public debate where one’s ideas and interests are confronted with 
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the ideas and interests of those who think differently. Sunstein (2001) claimed that contemporary media 
and the Internet have abetted a culture of polarization, in which people primarily seek out points of view 
to which they already subscribe, thereby becoming an echo chamber of already formed political 
orientations. From that stance, polarization could be explained by the sociological phenomenon called 
homophily (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001), by which interactions occur more often among 
similar people than among dissimilar people. 
 
Homophily is the basis of the ideological echo chamber effect—that is, the tendency of people to 
communicate with those who share their political views, thereby creating homogeneous groups. 
“Homophily limits people’s social worlds in a way that has powerful implications for the information they 
receive, the attitudes they form, and the interactions they experience” (McPherson et al., 2001, p. 415). 
This is crucial for the well-being of democracy. Exposure to like-minded people is associated with the 
adoption of extreme positions (Mutz & Martin, 2001) and polarized political stances (Himelboim, McCreery, 
& Smith, 2013), whereas individuals’ network heterogeneity is found to increase their political tolerance 
and appetite for information on different topics (Scheufele, Hardy, Brossard, Waismel-Manor, & Nisbet, 
2006). 
 
This study investigates whether Twitter facilitates the emergence of party and ideological echo 
chambers in online parliamentary networks. Rather than focusing on ordinary citizens’ Twitter political 
networks, this research aims to understand how social media affect communications among political elites 
(parliamentarians). The reasoning underlying this choice has to do with the different ways that members 
of parliament (MPs) and ordinary citizens use Twitter. Whereas MPs’ uses of Twitter (in their capacity as 
politicians) are anchored in considerations of political strategy, the use of Twitter by ordinary citizens is 
more diverse, including both political and nonpolitical goals. 
 
Twitter is a microblogging social media platform based on not-necessarily reciprocated 
relationships among users. It offers the possibility to create new information (tweet), spread the 
information (retweet), and establish dialogic conversations by using the systems of mentions (@) and 
hashtags (#). Twitter enhances relationship building (Briones, Kuch, Brooke, & Yan, 2011) and offers the 
potential to deliver conventional forms of discourse to a wider audience (Saebo, 2011) while personalizing 
communication flows to levels hitherto never reached in politics. 
 
This study contributes to the analysis of political polarization on Twitter by adding a Catalan 
perspective to previous research in the field (Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015; Conover, 
Ratkiewicz, Francisco, Gonçalves, & Flammini, 2011; Gruzd & Roy, 2014; Hong Sounman & Kim, 2016; 
Maireder, Schlögl, Schütz, Karwautz, & Waldheim, 2014; Takikawa & Nagayoshi, 2017; Yoon & Park, 
2014). It applies social network analyses and statistical techniques to answer the following research 
question: Does Twitter facilitate Catalan MPs’ exposure to cross-party and cross-ideological opinions, or 
does it confine them to like-minded clusters? We gathered all the Catalan parliamentarians’ relations 
(4,516), retweets (6,045), and mentions (19,507) from January 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014. We chose to 
study the Catalan case because the rise of the Catalan independence movement foregrounded 
fragmentation and ideological polarization in the Catalan party system, thereby providing the ideal context 
to examine cross-ideological and interpartisan interactions. Furthermore, 85% of the Catalan MPs are 
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Twitter users. To our knowledge, this is the first piece of research to employ a multiplex network approach 
(Garcia et al., 2015)—that is, the study of different layers of interaction—to study polarization in a 
European parliamentary Twitter network. 
 
The next section reviews related works on political polarization on Twitter and states the research 
hypotheses to be tested. We aim to tackle a gap in the research for understanding political polarization in 
online parliamentary networks in the social media age. We continue by introducing the Catalan case to 
contextualize the research. We then provide details on the data and the methods. Specifically, we describe 
the multiplex network approach, which allows us to pinpoint the degree of polarization in the Catalan MPs’ 
Twitter networks in the three different layers of interaction (relations, retweets, and mentions). Last, we 
outline the results and discuss the study findings, opening new avenues for future research. 
 
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses  
 
Democracies are based on a balance between political homogeneity and polarization. An excess 
of political homogeneity can render democratic choice meaningless (Sunstein, 2003), whereas too much 
polarization can create gridlock (Garcia et al., 2015, p. 46). Therefore, it is fundamental to understand 
how social media make this balance shift to one or the other extreme. Two main lines of research can be 
identified in the literature concerning political polarization and digital media: (a) studies showing how the 
Internet facilitates ideological self-segregation and (b) studies showing how the Internet increases 
exposure to political disagreement. 
 
The first line of research emphasizes that the Internet works as an “echo chamber” in which 
individuals are exposed to consonant views (Bimber & Davis, 2003). This view is supported by some 
empirical research such as that conducted by Adamic and Glance (2005) on political blogs. They found two 
differentiated political communities (liberal or left-wing and conservative or right-wing-leaning blogs) with 
a strong political correlation with some American newspapers. A similar tendency was found on Facebook 
by Gilbert and Karahalios (2009), revealing the connection between individuals’ political views and the 
probability that two people are connected on Facebook. Gaines and Mondak (2009) observed that students 
in a large American university had a marginal tendency to cluster together ideologically on Facebook. 
 
In the political Twittersphere, research also indicates the development and maintenance of 
ideologically homogeneous clusters. The study of tweets by Feller, Kuhnert, Sprenger, and Wellpe (2011) 
during the 2009 German federal elections discovered that political tweeters tended to be segregated along 
lines of shared political affiliation. Hsu and Park’s (2012) research on the communication relationships 
among members of the Korean National Assembly and their constituents showed that intraparty 
connections were stronger than interparty connections on Twitter. The social network and content analysis 
by Himelboim et al. (2013) of 10 controversial U.S. political topics on Twitter discovered that “political 
content, nonetheless, was overall confined to like-minded clusters of users” (p. 171). The analysis by 
Garcia et al. (2015) of the relations among Swiss politicians on politnetz.ch, a Swiss online platform 
focused on political activity, found a strongly polarized structure with respect to party alignment. Hong 
Sounman and Kim’s (2016) research on the Twitter activities of the members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives found evidence of a strong echo chamber communication environment. And Takikawa and 
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Nagayoshi’s (2017, p. 7) study of the Twitter political field in Japan suggested that whether an echo 
chamber occurs in Twitter depends on the topic of conversation—that is, right-wing followers wrote about 
Korea, Korean Japanese, and dual nationality issues, whereas left-wing followers wrote about conspiracy 
law and the corruption of government. The findings of this research about the relationship between echo 
chambers and political ideologies were consistent with those found by Boutyline and Willer (2017), who 
discovered that in the U.S. political Twittersphere, both more extreme and more conservative individuals 
were more likely than liberal and more moderate individuals to form homophilic ties. 
 
Given that the literature suggests that individuals are likely to seek agreement on social media, 
we expect political homophily to be prevalent in social media. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Communication flows of the Catalan parliamentary Twitter networks (relations, retweets, and 
mentions) will be polarized along party and ideological lines (“echo chamber hypothesis”). 
 
However, not all the literature in this area finds increased political polarization. Research has 
shown that, even if individuals tend to interact with those who think alike, new media also facilitate cross-
ideological contacts with those who think differently. Wojcieszak and Mutz (2009) studied Americans’ 
participation in chat rooms and discovered that exposure to heterogeneous political views happened 
accidentally and that the potential for deliberation occurred primarily in the groups where politics were not 
the central purpose of the discussion space. Brundidge (2010) found evidence that through inadvertent 
exposure, the Internet increased the heterogeneity of political discussion networks, and thus people’s 
exposure to political difference. Gil de Zúñiga and Valenzuela (2011) found that social media facilitated 
unexpected contacts with weak ties, thereby increasing the likelihood of individuals to be exposed to 
different political views. And more recently, a study by Dubois and Blank (2018) of the United Kingdom’s 
high-choice media environment found that a greater interest in politics and more media diversity 
decreases an individual’s likelihood of being caught in an echo chamber. 
 
Results from research on Twitter use also show cross-ideological exchanges of political meanings. 
Colleoni et al.’s (2014) study of the political homophily structure of the complete network of 2009 Twitter 
users pointed to high levels of homogeneity among them, but it also revealed that the processes of 
information diffusion in that medium could facilitate individuals’ exposure to different political viewpoints. 
Barberá et al. (2015) discovered that for political issues, information was exchanged among individuals 
with similar ideological preferences, and for nonpolitical events, ideological homophily in the propagation 
of the content was low—thus not conforming to the notion of an echo chamber. These findings were 
corroborated by Vaccari et al. (2016) in their research of German and Italian Twitter users. They found 
that “social media platforms are not ‘echo chambers’ of univocal agreement, but ‘contrarian clubs’ where 
political disagreement is common” (p. 6). 
 
Most interestingly for the purposes of this research are, perhaps, some findings of previous 
research that discovered that cross-party and cross-ideological connections on Twitter are dependent on 
the layers (relations, retweets, and mentions) in which the interactions among users take place. Several 
studies in different countries reach similar conclusions: The relations and retweet networks are highly 
polarized, but the mention network shows interconnections among opposed ideologies. Yardi and boyd’s 
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(2010) study of tweets on the shooting of physician George Tiller and conversations among pro-life and 
pro-choice advocates revealed that “people are more likely to reply to people who share the same view” 
(p. 13) but that there were also conversations between opposing viewpoints. The analysis by Conover et 
al. (2011) of political hashtags some weeks before U.S. congressional midterm elections observed that 
retweets reproduced the known partisan split in the online world, while the mention network indicated that 
ideologically opposed individuals interacted with one other. Yoon and Park’s (2014) study of Korean 
politicians’ use of Twitter revealed that the relations network was a social ritual network (with high 
reciprocity), whereas the mention network was a network of political support that frequently crossed 
ideologies. Boutet, Kim, and Yoneki (2012) investigated the use of Twitter during the 2010 UK general 
election and found that the retweet graph presented a highly segregated partisan structure and that party 
members were more likely to retweet content from their own party than from other parties. And Gruzd 
and Roy’s (2014) analysis of 5,918 tweets on the 2011 Canadian federal election showed a clustering 
effect around shared political views among supporters of the same party in the overall communication 
network of Twitter, but also “evidence of cross-ideological discourse” (p. 38). 
 
In Catalonia, previous research has found that the different layers of interaction seem to perform 
different functions and that parliamentarians behave strategically in this media environment. New opinion 
leaders who are not party leaders draw most of the retweets and mentions in the parliamentary Twitter 
networks (Borge & Esteve Del Valle, 2017a, 2017b). 
 
In sum, given that previous research has shown that political interactions on Twitter are party 
and ideologically polarized but that the degree of that polarization depends on the layer of interaction 
(relations, retweets, and mentions) in which the communication flows1 take place, we propose the 
following hypothesis:  
 
H2: The Catalan parliamentary Twitter mention network will reveal more cross-party and cross-
ideological connections than will the relations network and the retweet network (“cross-cutting 
interactions’ hypothesis”).  
 
Case Selection  
 
The Catalan parliament was an early adopter of social networking. On March 17, 2009, the 
parliament launched a project called Parlament 2.0 to “adapt[ing] the Parliament to the new active role of 
users with social media” (Benach, 2010); to that end, it opened a YouTube channel and Facebook and 
Twitter profiles. Moreover, in October 2013, the parliament launched Escó 136—a website where Catalan 
citizenry can leave comments and suggestions regarding projects and laws.2 
 
                                               
1 Manuel Castells (2009) defines these flows as “streams of information between nodes circulating through 
the channels of connection between nodes” (p. 20). 
2 Escó 136 refers to an additional seat in the 135-member parliament. Citizens’ comments and 
suggestions are transferred to the authorities in charge of drawing up Catalan legislation, and they are to 
be annexed to the law initiative (see Parlament de Catalunya, n.d.). 
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Catalan representatives also took advantage of these online technologies, as demonstrated by 
the proportion of Catalan parliamentarians with Twitter profiles in 2014 (85%)—greater than the 
percentage in the Spanish central parliament (52.6%; Alvarez, 2013), the Spanish senate (33.06%; 
Alvarez, n.d.), the German Bundestag (31.61%; Thamm & Bleier, 2013), and the UK House of Commons 
(72.3%; Heaven, 2013), but somewhat behind the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives (100% and 
90%, respectively; Sharp, 2013). 
 
During the period when this research was conducted, Catalonia was witnessing an exceptional 
political context characterized by demands for a referendum on independence as well as widespread 
protests against austerity measures.3 In this conflicting political context, social media played a role in 
political communication and mobilization. Figures compiled by the Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió (2014), a 
Catalan governmental center for public opinion studies, show notable use among the Catalan citizenry of 
the Internet (27.8%) and social networks (19.7%) for political purposes. 
 
After the elections of November 25, 2012, the Catalan party system was fragmented into a wide 
variety of fringe and medium-size parties: CiU, ERC, PSC, PP, ICV-EUiA, C’s, and CUP. CiU stands for 
Convergence and Union, a center-right Catalan nationalist party. It gained 50 seats in the 2012 elections. 
ERC stands for Republican Left of Catalonia, and it is a left-wing, pro-independence party. It won 21 seats 
in the elections. PSC is the Socialist Party of Catalonia. In the 2012 elections it gained 20 seats. PP is the 
People’s Party of Catalonia, a right-wing, Spanish nationalist party that won 19 seats. ICV-EUiA is a left-
wing party self-defined as eco-socialist, which gained 13 seats. C’s stands for Citizens, a centrist and non-
Catalan-nationalist party that won nine seats. And CUP stands for Candidacy of Popular Unity; it is an 
extreme left and pro-independence coalition and won three seats in the 2012 election. Furthermore, the 
Catalan party system was distributed along two main ideological cleavages: left-wing/right-wing and 
Catalan nationalist/non-Catalan nationalist (see Figure 1). Consequently, the fragmentation and 
ideological divisions in the Catalan party system enabled us to carry out in-depth testing of hypotheses 
related to interaction and communication within and between parliamentary groups. 
 
Last, several studies had shown that social media were contributing to the equalization of 
opportunities for political communication among Catalan parties, since new, fringe, and medium-size 
parties as well as parties from various political positions achieve greater online interaction and 




                                               
3 In 2013 there were 6,000 demonstrations in Catalonia, Department of the Interior (see “Es disparen les 
manifestacions a Catalunya,” 2013). According to Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió (2013) figures for June, 45.2% 
of survey respondents were in favor of Catalan independence (N = 2,000). 
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Figure 1. The position of Catalan parties on the political spectrum of 
Catalonia according to Catalan respondents. Second round of Centre 





We decided to focus on Twitter because the platform is one of the most popular social media 
worldwide, 85% of the Catalan MPs are Twitter users, and it is relatively easy to access Twitter data. We 
scraped the Twitter accounts of the Catalan parliamentarians and retrieved all the relations (4,516), 
retweets (6,045), and mentions (19,507) from January 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014. These digital traces 
are analogous to those used in previous works on Twitter for U.S. politicians (Conover et al., 2011), 
German politicians (Lietz, Wagner, Bleier, & Strohmaier, 2014), and Swiss politicians on politnez.ch 
(Garcia et al., 2015). By scraping the Twitter accounts of the Catalan MPs, we were able to avoid the 
restriction on data collection imposed by the Twitter streaming API service, which allows retrieval of a 
sample (around 1%) of the total amount of tweets posted at any given moment, but the methods that 
Twitter uses to sample this data are currently unknown (see González-Bailón, Wang, Rivero, & Borge-
Holthoefer, 2014; Morstatter, Pfeffer, Liu, & Carley, 2013). 
 
In addition to the Twitter data, we used a representative survey from June 20, 2013, conducted by 
the Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió to calculate parties’ positions on the two axes of the Catalan party system—the 
left/right axis and the nationalism axis—based on the positions attributed by the interviewees. 
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Method 
 
We tested the degree of party and ideological polarization in the three layers of interaction 
(relations, retweets, and mentions) of the Catalan parliamentarians’ Twitter network by means of three 
types of analyses: network visualizations, network polarization, and network topology measurements. We 
used the open-source software GEPHI to visualize the relations, retweets, and mentions networks of the 
Catalan MPs. Each node belongs to all layers and represents a parliamentarian with a Twitter account. An 
MP1 has a directed link to MP2 if MP1 follows MP2. The retweets and mentions are also directed, but links 
have weights equivalent to the number of retweets and mentions that MP1 gave to MP2. These three layers 
compose a multiplex network (Menichetti, Remondini, Panzarasa, Mondragón, & Bianconi, 2014). Multiplex 
networks have one-to-one relationships between nodes across the layers. An example of an analysis of 
political polarization in multiplex networks is the study of interactions among Swiss politicians on the 
politnez.ch platform, in which they can support other politicians or like or comment on their posts (Garcia 
et al., 2015). 
 
To measure party polarization in the three layers of the Catalan parliamentary Twitter network, 
we used UCINET and calculated the external-internal (E-I) index. This is an index developed by Krackhardt 
and Stern (1988) as a measure of the group embedding based on comparing the number of ties within 
groups and between groups. It takes the number of ties of group members to outsiders, subtracts the 
number of ties to other group members, and divides by the total number of ties. The resulting index 
ranges from −1 (all ties are internal to the group) to +1 (all ties are external to the group). To assess 
whether a given E-I index value is significantly different from what would be expected by random mixing 
(i.e., no preference by group members for ties within or outside the group), a permutation test is 
performed (the default is 5,000 trials). The range of possible values of the E-I index is restricted by the 
number of groups, relative group sizes, and the total number of ties in a graph. This is why it is important 
to rescale the coefficient. 
 
To measure the ideological polarization in the three layers of the parliamentary Twitter network, 
we computed the Pearson correlation coefficient of the density score of the pairs of parties in the E-I index 
(1 total possible relations and 0 null relations between the parties) versus the Euclidean distance between 
pairs of parties in the Catalan two-dimensional ideological space (left/right; Catalan nationalist/non-
Catalan nationalist). The logic behind this measure is that the greater the distance between the parties in 
the ideological spaces, the less likely they will interact on the three layers of the Catalan parliamentary 
Twitter network. 
 
In addition, we examined other indicators of network polarization that are commonly used to 
characterize network topology or structure. We suspected that MPs of parliamentary groups with similar 
network structures and who are closely positioned on the ideological axes will be more likely to interact on 
Twitter than those with dissimilar structures and who are ideologically opposed (see H1). We chose to 
analyze the relations network because it best reflects partisan affiliation (Esteve Del Valle & Borge, 2017) 
and is the most stable over time. Following the work of Garcia et al. (2015), we calculated four network 
metrics: 
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• Party network density describes the proportion of total connections in a network 
that are actual connections, ranging from 1 (all ties are connected) to 0 (no ties). 
By computing this measure, we expect to find the degree of cohesiveness among 
MPs at a party level. 
 
• Hierarchical structure is obtained by calculating the in-degree (the number of 
followers a parliamentarian’s Twitter account holds) centralization as the average 
difference between the in-degree of the politician with the most followers within the 
party and the in-degree of all the other politicians. A party with an in-degree 
centralization of 1 means that one MP is attracting all the followers—that is, 
representing a network with the strongest hierarchical structure. A party with an in-
degree centralization of 0 means that all the MPs have the same number of 
followers, thereby exhibiting the most egalitarian structure. 
 
• Information efficiency is measured in each of the party networks by using the 
average path length measure. This is a concept in network topology defined as the 
average number of steps along the shortest paths for all possible pairs of the 
network nodes. It is a measure of the efficiency of information transport in a 
network: the shorter the path length, the easier it is to traverse the network and 
reach other nodes. Thus, the higher the index, the worse the information efficiency. 
 
• Social resilience of a network―the ability to withstand external stress―is measured 
via the k-core: the maximal group of actors, all of whom are connected to a number 
of other members of the group. We want to find the resilient core of the party 
networks by estimating their maximum k-core number of MPs. The lower the k-




We tested the degree of party and ideological polarization in the three layers of interaction 
(relations, retweets, and mentions) through visual representation and the measurement of network 
polarization and network topologies. To visually observe the ideological polarization in the three layers, we 
created network visualizations of the three parliamentary Twitter networks. Figures 2, 3, and 4 illustrate 
the network layers of the Catalan parliamentary Twitter network. The nodes are colored according to party 
affiliation. The size of the nodes is equivalent to their degree in the networks (number of followers, 
number of retweets received, and number of mentions received, respectively). We used the ForceAtlas2 
algorithm layout, which locates connected nodes closer to one another. As shown in the figures, Catalan 
MPs’ communication flows are polarized along party lines in the three layers. However, increased cross-
ideological and cross-party connections can be found in the mention network. This is shown, for instance, 
by the closeness in the graph between the MPs of ERC (a left-wing, Catalan nationalist party) and the MPs 
of PP and C’s (both right-wing, non-Catalan nationalist parties), indicating an intense flow of 
communication between these ideologically opposed parliamentarians. 
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Figure 2. The relations Twitter network of Catalan MPs. For visualization purposes, 
the nodes of the network are the MPs having between 40 and 75 followers 
(maximum). The size of the nodes is equivalent to the number of followers in the 
network. The color of the nodes represents the political party: orange = CIU, 
yellow = ERC, red = PSC, blue = PP, green = ICV, brown = C’s, and violet = CUP. 
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Figure 3. The retweet Twitter network of Catalan MPs. For visualization purposes, 
the nodes of the network are the MPs having between 40 and 75 followers 
(maximum). The size of the nodes is equivalent to the number of retweets received 
in the network. The color of the nodes represents the political party: orange = CIU, 
yellow = ERC, red = PSC, blue = PP, green = ICV, brown = C’s, and violet = CUP. 
 
1726  Marc Esteve Del Valle and Rosa Borge Bravo International Journal of Communication 12(2018) 
 
Figure 4. The mentions Twitter network of Catalan MPs. For visualization purposes, 
the nodes of the network are the MPs having between 40 and 75 followers 
(maximum). The size of the nodes is equivalent to the number of mentions received 
in the network. The color of the nodes represents the political party: orange = CIU, 
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Analyzing the percentages of total possible interactions of each parliamentary group with itself 
and with other groups, we find that the percentage of mentions achieved with their own group (66%) is 
lower than both the percentage of relations with their own group (91%) and the percentage of retweets 
with their own group (88.5%). 
 
To assess party polarization, we computed the E-I index of each network of interaction. Table 1 
shows the results of our analyses.  
 
Table 1. Rescaled E-I Index of the Catalan Parliamentary Twitter Networks. 
 
 Relations network Retweet network Mention network 
Rescaled E-I index  −0.563 −0.128 −0.082 




The values of the rescaled E-I index (number of iterations: 5,000)―which takes into account the 
group sizes of the parties―show that the three layers of the Catalan parliamentary Twitter network are 
polarized. The degree of polarization, however, varies among the layers: The layer of relations is highly 
polarized (−0.563); the retweet network (−0.128) is less polarized than the relations network; and the 
degree of polarization of the mention network is almost null (−0.082). 
 
To measure the ideological polarization in the three layers of the Catalan parliamentary Twitter 
network, we computed the Pearson correlation coefficient of the pairs of parties in the E-I index versus the 
Euclidean distance between pairs of parties in the Catalan two-dimensional ideological space (left/right; 
Catalan nationalist/non-Catalan nationalist). Table 2 shows the results of our analyses. 
 
Table 2. Pearson Correlation Coefficient of the Density of the Pairs of Parties  
in the E-I Index and Their Pairwise Euclidean Distance. 
 
 Relations network Retweet network Mention network 
R Pearson  −0.344 (p = .024) −0.145 (p = .067) −0.144 (p = .075) 
 
 
The relations network shows a negative (−0.344) and significant (p = .024) correlation. This 
indicates a high level of polarization in the relations network and means that the closer the parties are on 
the ideological axes, the more likely their MPs are to follow one another on Twitter. The retweet network 
shows a negative (−0.145) but not significant (p = .067) correlation. The mention network also shows a 
negative (−0.144) but not significant (p = .075) correlation. Consequently, data from the retweet and the 
mention network are not sufficient to reject the null hypothesis that the two variables are not related, 
thereby showing that more cross-ideological interactions among parties occur in these networks than in 
the relations network. However, the negative value of the Pearson correlation in both networks indicates a 
preference by the parties to communicate with parties in close proximity on the ideological axes. 
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Last, we analyzed the topology of the relations network of each parliamentary group in the two-
dimensional ideological space (left/right; Catalan nationalist/non-Catalan nationalist) by means of four 
indicators (density, hierarchical structure, information efficiency, social resilience). Figure 5 shows the 
value of the social network metrics versus the position of each party on both axes. 
 
 
Figure 5. Social network metrics of the Catalan parliamentary groups in the relations 
network versus their position in the ideological space. 
 
 
As can be observed, the smallest and least institutionalized parties (C’s and CUP) 
are―independently of their position on the ideological axes—the densest, most egalitarian, most 
information efficient, and robust against external shocks. These parties, notwithstanding the low 
frequency of their relations, constitute a specific group, thereby corroborating our previous findings that 
these two parties behave differently than other Catalan parliamentary groups on social media (Esteve Del 
Valle & Borge, 2017). 
 
Left-wing parties (ERC and PSC) show higher density and less hierarchical networks than right-
wing parties (CiU and PP), and Catalan nationalist parties (CiU, ERC, and ICV) show social network 
communities with lower information efficiency than non-Catalan nationalist parties (PP and C’s). Last, ICV 
constitutes a fringe case. Although it is a left-wing party, it shows the second lowest density network and 
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Discussion 
 
This research is a first attempt to study polarization in the Catalan parliamentary Twitter 
network. It contributes to the debate on online polarization by studying this phenomenon in a crucial 
milieu for the well-being of democracy. We scraped the Twitter accounts of Catalan parliamentarians and 
retrieved all the relations (4,516), retweets (6,045), and mentions (19,507) among them from January 1, 
2013, to March 31, 2014. We chose the Catalan case because the rise of the Catalan independence 
movement has increased fragmentation and ideological divisions in the Catalan party system, allowing us 
to test polarization hypotheses among the parliamentary groups. Furthermore, 85% of Catalan MPs are 
Twitter users. 
 
The study was conducted in the context of an extraordinary moment in the political history of 
Catalonia. Dealing with the harshest economic crisis since the 1980s, CiU, the ruling party, moved away 
from its previous position on the independence debate and took a position in favor of a referendum on 
independence. This strengthened the relevance of the nationalist cleavage over the left/right cleavage and 
shaped the Catalan political agenda that endures today. 
 
In such a fragmented and ideologically divided party system, our multiplex network analysis of 
interactions by Catalan MPs on Twitter shows a tendency toward a party and ideological homophily 
(McPherson et al., 2001), which corroborates the echo chamber hypothesis (H1). Catalan MPs prefer 
communicating on Twitter with members of their own party and with parliamentarians who are closely 
positioned on the same political axes (left/right; Catalan nationalist/non-Catalan nationalist). These results 
are in line with findings of previous research that discovered political tweeters to be polarized around their 
party affiliation (Feller et al., 2011; Garcia et al., 2015; Hsu & Park, 2012) and ideology (Boutyline & 
Willer, 2017; Himelboim et al., 2013; Hong Sounman & Kim, 2016). More broadly, they seem to 
corroborate Sunstein’s (2001) claims about the polarization culture triggered by the Internet and 
contemporary media. 
 
Nevertheless, we also found the degree of polarization of the Catalan parliamentary Twitter 
network to depend on the layer in which the interactions take place. Similar to previous research in other 
countries (Conover et al., 2011; Garcia et al., 2015; Gruzd & Roy, 2014), we found that the degree of 
polarization in the relations network and the retweet network is higher than it is in the mention network 
(H2), in which the highest number of cross-party and cross-ideological interactions occur among the 
Catalan MPs who think differently (e.g., between the MPs of ERC and those of PP). Thus, Twitter seems to 
have a dual nature and be conducive to both the heterogeneous public sphere and the echo chamber 
scenario (Colleoni et al., 2014): It confines communication flows among party representatives who are 
ideologically alike, but it also facilitates dialogue among MPs from different parties and ideologies.  
 
Several reasons might explain the different degrees of polarization in the Catalan MPs’ Twitter 
networks. First, the affordances of Twitter networks are conducive to different types of communication—
that is, the following-follower network is a relational network, the retweet network is a support network, 
and the mention network is a dialogical network. Related to this, our study finds that Catalan MPs use the 
relation and the retweet networks mainly to follow and support the MPs of their party and those who think 
1730  Marc Esteve Del Valle and Rosa Borge Bravo International Journal of Communication 12(2018) 
alike, whereas they use the mention network to interact with the MPs who think differently. Finally, the 
intensity of cross-party and cross-ideological interactions between the MPs in the mention network could 
be explained by the fact that MPs use the affordances of this network to criticize one another. However, 
this hypothesis exceeds the scope of the present study and should be addressed by an analysis of the 
mentions’ content. 
 
Our research has important implications for understanding whether social media contribute to 
widening the public sphere in online parliamentary networks. Our findings indicate that Twitter exchanges 
between Catalan MPs first and foremost take place within their parties or among MPs who think alike. This 
seems to corroborate the existence of echo chambers and homophilic relations among the Catalan MPs. 
However, our results also show considerable variation in the degrees of political polarization across the 
layers of the Catalan parliamentary Twitter network and reveal cross-ideological and cross-party 
exchanges of meanings among Catalan MPs who think differently. These results align with those found by 
Karlsen, Steen-Johnsen, Wollebaek, and Enjolras (2017) in their experimental study of online debates, 
which states that the “Internet provides the opportunity to interact with like-minded people and those with 
opposite views at the same time” (p. 270), and they seem to corroborate Barbera et al.’s (2015) suspicion 
that previous studies in the field might have overestimated the degree of political polarization in social 
media. 
 
Furthermore, we detected that right-wing parties have less dense social networks than left-wing 
parties and that ICV (a left-wing, green party) has the most hierarchical organization. The results 
concerning the low density of the right-wing parties are in line with what Garcia et al. (2015) found for 
Switzerland and contradict those found by Conover et al. (2011) in the United States, which showed that 
right-leaning users had a higher online social cohesion than left-leaning users. Furthermore, the 
hierarchical centralization of ICV also resembles the findings of Garcia et al. (2015, p. 62) for Switzerland, 
where green parties also showed a significantly high in-degree centralization. 
 
Could our research be replicated in other countries or party systems? The object of our study is 
parliamentarians’ communication flows and networks on Twitter, and these are comparable entities across 
party systems and countries. Consequently, our theoretical framework and the statistical and network 
analyses used are applicable to all kinds of political contexts. However, future research should undertake a 
better exploration of three issues that have not been sufficiently studied. First, it is reasonable to 
complement our analysis of the directions of the communication flows among Catalan parliamentarians 
with an examination of the content of the information transmitted through Twitter interactions to better 
ascertain the nature of the polarization and the differences between layers of interaction (Gruzd & Roy, 
2014; Takikawa & Nagayoshi, 2017; Yoon & Park, 2014). Second, it seems necessary to carry out more 
comparative analyses of the parliamentary Twitter networks of different and similar party systems. 
Considering the political context in every country (Colleoni et al., 2014) would help reach general 
conclusions about how MPs and parties deal with social media. Last, a longitudinal analysis of Catalan MPs’ 
interactions on Twitter could illuminate differences in party and ideological polarization in the Catalan 
parliamentary Twitter network. 
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In conclusion, considering the broader debate on cyberpolitics, this research shows that MPs 
behave strategically in parliamentary Twitter networks when it comes to using the different layers of 
communication. Parliamentarians show a clear tendency toward homophily in the relations and retweet 
networks, but cross-party and cross-ideological connections occur more often in the mention network 
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